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MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE, TRUTH-MAKERS, AND 
THE "GROUNDING OBJECTION" 
Will aim Lane Craig 
The so-called "grounding objection" is the most commonly raised misgiv-
ing which philosophers have to the doctrine of divine middle knowledge: 
how can counterfactuals of creaturely freedom be true when there is no 
ground of their truth? I hope to show that the theory of truth known as 
Truth-Maker Theory can help to shed considerable light on this objection, 
revealing just how difficult it is to formulate a compelling version of the 
objection. For it is far from evident that counterfactuals of creature!y free-
dom must have truth-makers or, if they must, that appropriate candidates 
for their truth-makers arc not available. 
Introduction 
Thomas Flint has observed that the so-called "grounding objection" is in 
the minds of many philosophers "the principal obstacle" to endorsing the 
Molinist doctrine of divine middle knowledge.! I share Flint's impression. 
What is ironic about this situation is not merely the fact that the many 
Molinist responses to the grounding objection remain largely ignored or 
unrefuted in the literature, nor yet again the fact that Molinist solutions to 
the objection tend to be far more sophisticated philosophically than the 
almost casual statements of the objection itself; rather the irony is that this 
allegedly powerful objection has virtually never been articulated or 
defended in any depth by its advocates. Contrary to Flint's claim that the 
objection "is as easy to state as it is difficult fully to resolve,"2 I hope to 
show that this objection is far from easy to state adequately-we shall see 
that Flint's own formulation is inadequate-and far from easy to defend. 
No anti-Molinist has, to my knowledge, yet responded to Alvin 
Plantinga's simple retort to the grounding objection: "It seems to me much 
clearer that some counterfactuals of freedom are at least possibly true than 
that the truth of propositions must, in general, be grounded in this way."3 
What Plantinga understands-and grounding objectors apparently by and 
large do not-is that behind the grounding objection lies a theory about the 
relationship of truth and reality which needs to be articulated, defended, 
and then applied to counterfactuals of freedom if the grounding objection 
is to carry any probative force. Anti-Molinists have not even begun to 
address these issues. 
What is the grounding objection? It is the claim that there are no true 
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counterfactuals concerning what creatures would freely do under certain 
specified circumstances-the propositions expressed by such counterfactu-
al sentences are said either to have no truth value or to be uniformly 
false--, since there is nothing to make these counterfactuals true. Because 
they are contrary-to-fact conditionals and are supposed to be true logically 
pdor to God's creative decree, there is no ground of the truth of such coun-
terfactual propositions. Thus, they cannot be known by God. 
Warrant for the Molinist Assumption 
Before scrutinizing this objection, it deserves to be underlined just how 
radical a claim it makes. It asserts that there are no true counterfactuals 
about how creatures would freely act under any given set of circum-
stances. This assertion is no mere ostensibly undercutting defeater of 
Molinism, but a putatively rebutting defeater. It makes a bold and positive 
assertion and therefore requires warrant in excess of that which attends the 
Molinist assumption that there are true counterfactuals about creaturely 
free actions. And the warrant for the Molinist belief that there are such 
truths is not at all inconsiderable: First, we ourselves often appear to know 
such true counterfactuals. Very little reflection is required to reveal how 
pervasive and indispensable a role such counterfactuals play in rational 
conduct and planning. We not infrequently base our very lives upon the 
assumption of their truth or falsity. Second, it is plausible that the Law of 
Conditional Excluded Middle (LCEM) holds for counterfactuals of a cer-
tain special form, usually called "counterfactuals of creaturely freedom." 
COl.mtedactuals of creaturely freedom are c01.mterfactuals of the form If S 
were in C, S would freely do A, where S is a created agent, A is some action, 
and C is a set of fully specified circumstances including the whole history 
of the world up until the time of S's free action. According to LCEM for 
any counterfactual p D~ q, (p D~ q) v (p D~--,q). Molinists need not and 
should not endorse LCEM unqualifiedly. There is no reason to think, for 
example, that if Suarez were to have scratched his head on June 8, 1582, 
then either Freddoso would have scratched his head on June 8, 1982 or 
would not have scratched his head on June 8, 1982. But it is plausible that 
counterfactuals of the very specialized sort we are considering must be 
either true or false. For since the circumstances C in which the free agent is 
placed are fully specified in the counterfactual's antecedent, it seems that if 
the agent were placed in C and left free with respect to action A, then he 
must either do A or not do A. For what other alternative is there?4 Third, 
the Scriptures are replete with counterfactual statements, so that the 
Christian theist, at least, should be committed to the truth of certain coun-
terfactuals about free, creaturely actions. The Church has never, until the 
modern age, doubted that God possesses knowledge of true counterfactu-
als concerning free, creaturely decisions; the whole dispute focused on 
whether He possessed that knowledge logically prior to the divine creative 
decree or only posterior to the divine decree. The Church's confidence that 
God knows such truths is rooted in the Scriptures themselves. To pick but 
one example, Paul, in reflecting upon God's eternal salvific plan realized in 
Christ, asserts, "None of the rulers of this age understood this; for if they 
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had, they would not have crucified the Lord of Clory" (I Cor. 2.8). By "the 
rulers of this age" Paul means either the Jewish and Roman authorities 
such as Herod and Pilate who were the historical agents who instigated or 
carried out the crucifixion (d. Acts 4. 27-28) or, more plausibly, the spiritu-
al principalities and powers who rule "this present evil age" (Cal. 1. 4; d. I 
Cor. 2. 6). In either case, we have here a counterfactual about creaturely 
free actions. So is Paul's assertion true or not? Will we have the temerity 
to say that Paul was wrong? Since the Church believes that Paul was 
inspired by the Holy Spirit to write these words, she accepts them as 
revealed truth from God. Thus, we have strong prima facie warrant for 
holding that there are true counterfactuals concerning what creatures 
would freely do under various circumstances. 
In light of these considerations the grounding objector might retreat to 
the position that although there are now true counterfactuals about crea-
turely free acts, there are none logically prior to the divine creative decree. 
But then the grounding objector owes us a still more nuanced account of 
the grounding objection, since there seems to be no more ground now for 
many counterfactuals about creaturely free acts than there is logically prior 
to Cod's decree. Moreover, limiting the truth of such counterfactuals to a 
moment logically posterior to God's decree appears to make God the 
author of sin and to obliterate human freedom, since in that case it is God 
who decrees which counterfactuals about creaturely free acts are true, 
including counterfactuals concerning sinful human decisions. Thus, we 
have good reason for thinking that if such counterfactuals are now true or 
false, they must have been so logically prior to Cod's decree. 
The point of these considerations is simply to underscore that the 
grounding objection, if it is to be successful, must, as a rebutting defeater, 
have more warrant than that enjoyed by the Molinist assumption that 
there are true counterfactuals concerning creaturely free actions. The 
Molinist is under no obligation to provide warrant for that assumption, 
since he is merely proposing a model which is intended as one possible 
solution to the alleged antinomy of divine sovereignty and human free-
dom. Nevertheless, if the model's detractors aim to defeat that solution by 
rebutting one of its elements, namely, the assumption that there are true 
counterfactuals about how creatures would freely behave under certain 
circumstances, then it is worth emphasizing the warrant that can be given 
for that assumption, since such warrant makes it all the more difficult to 
defeat that feature of the Molinist model. . 
The Grounding Objection and Truth-Maker Theory 
So what can be said on behalf of the grounding objection? I have said 
that the grounding objection seems to assume a particular theory about the 
relationship of truth and reality. The theory presupposed by the ground-
ing objection appears to be a certain construal or version of a view of truth 
as correspondence which has come to be known as the theory of truth-mak-
ers.' During the realist revival in the early years of the twentieth century 
various philosophers turned their attention to the question of the ontology 
of truth. Logical Atomists such as Russell and Wittgenstein thought that in 
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addition to truth-bearers, whether these be sentences, thoughts, proposi-
tions, or what have you, there must also be entities in virtue of which such 
sentences and/ or propositions are true. Various names were employed for 
these entities, such as "facts" or "states of affairs." Among contemporary 
philosophers they have come to be known as "truth-makers." 
A truth-maker is typically defined as that in virtue of which a sentence 
and/or a proposition is true. According to Peter Simons, "Truth-maker theory 
accepts the role of something which makes a proposition true, that is, 
whose existence suffices for the proposition to be true. But it does not 
automatically pronounce on the ontological category of the truth-maker."o 
"T ndeed," he insists, "anything whatever is a truth-maker."7 But historically 
the orthodox view has identified truth-makers with such abstract realities 
as facts or states of affairs-more often than not, the fact stated as a propo-
sition's truth condition, as disclosed by the disquotation principle. Thus, 
what makes the statement" Al Plantinga is an avid rock-climber" true is 
the fact that Ai Plantinga is an avid rock-climber or the state of affairs of Al 
Plantinga's being an avid rock-climber. 
Now we inunediately see the potentially misleading connotations of the 
term "truth-maker" for such entities. For making sounds like a causal rela-
tion between a truth-bearer and some concrete object, but truth-maker theo-
rists are quite clear that the relation is by no means causal. An entity a 
makes a proposition p true if and only if that a exists entails that p.' That 
truth-makers are usually conceived to be such abstract entities as facts or 
states of affairs underlines the point that a causal relation is not at issue here. 
That the relation between a truth-maker and a truth-bearer is not causal 
is especially evident if we require truth-makers for negative existential 
statements like "Baal does not exist." According to Kevin Mulligan, Peter 
Simons, and Barry Smith, "Not only Wittgenstein, but indeed almost all 
other philosophers who have investigated the relation of making true, 
have felt compelled in the face of the problems raised by negative proposi-
tions to adopt an ontology of truth makers as special, non-objectual entities 
having a complexity which is essentially logical.''') Obviously a fact like 
Baal's non-existence, which is sufficient for the truth that Baal does not 
exist, is not a cause of anything. 
A proper understanding of truth-makers, then, invalidates at once the 
crude construal of the grounding objection expressed in Robert Adams's 
statement of the problem and again in Alfred Freddoso's and Thomas 
Flint's respective formulations of the grounding objection: 
Counterfactuals of freedom ... are supposed to be contingent truths 
that are not caused to be true by God. Who or what does cause them 
to be true?1O 
... metaphysically contingent propositions ... require causal ground-
ing in order to be true. That is, they must be caused to be true by some 
agent or agents, since it is not of their nature to be true.11 
But if such conditionals are contingent, they might not have been 
true. Who, then, makes them true? Or, to phrase this question more 
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carefully: Who or what actually causes the ones that are true to be 
true and the ones that are false to be false? 
... neither God nor his free creatures cause counterfactuals of 
creaturcly freedom to be true .... The conclusion that seems forced 
upon us, then, is that nobody actually causes the counterfactua Is in 
question to be true. 
The truth-maker theorist would take it as understood that nobody actually 
causes counterfactuals or any other sort of proposition to be true. 13 The 
demand for a cause of a proposition's being true is inept, unless the anti-
Molinist is presupposing some very special causal theory of truth-makers, in 
which case he owes us an articulation of that theory and a defense, not mere-
ly of its adequacy, but of its superiority to customary truth-maker theories. 
It might be said that the demand for a cause of the truth of true counter-
factuals of creaturely freedom is a mere rhetorical flourish on the part of 
the anti-Molinist. But even if we give him the benefit of the doubt in this 
regard, the fact remains that the anti-Molinist still seems to be presuppos-
ing that in order to be true, counterfactuals of freedom must have truth-
makers that either are or imply the existence of concrete objects. Not only 
does he owe us some explanation and justification for restricting truth-
makers in this way, but such an assumption seems quite implausible. For 
we can think of other types of true propositions whose truth-makers nei-
ther are nor imply the existence of concrete objects. Consider, for example, 
the following statements: 
1. No physical objects exist. 
2. Dinosaurs are extinct today. 
3. All ravens are black. 
4. Torturing a child is wrong. 
5. Napoleon lost the Battle of Waterloo. 
6. The U. S. President in 2070 will be a woman. 
7. If a rigid rod were placed in uniform motion through the aether, it 
would suffer a FitzGerald-Lorentz contraction. 
Statement (1) could be true and statement (2) is true, yet they preclude truth-
makers which are or imply the existence of the relevant concrete objects 
(such as dinosaurs). If such statements have truth-makers they would seem 
to be such things as the state of affairs of there being no universe or of dinosaurs' 
no longer existing. Some truth-maker theorists have maintained that such 
negative existential statements are true without having any truth-makers. 
For example, Mulligan, Simons, and Smith assert, "it seems more adequate 
to regard sentences of the given kind as true not in virtue of ,illY truth maker 
of their own, but simply in virtue of the fact that the corresponding positive 
sentences have no truth maker. "14 But this assertion is self-contradictory. For 
a truth-maker is precisely that entity in virtue of which a sentence and/or 
proposition is true, and on their account a true, negative existential statement 
like "Baal does not exist" is true in virtue of the fact that the corresponding 
positive statement "Baal exists" lacks a truth-maker. Thus, this negative 
existential statement does have a truth-maker after all, namely, the fact that 
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"Baal exists" hilS no truth-maker. A similar problem seems to attend D. M. 
Armstrong's attempt to eliminate truth-makers for negative existential state-
ments on the basis of the second-order state of affairs of there being all the 
first-order states of affairs there are." Presumably the idea is that if the state 
of affairs described by the corresponding positive existential statement is not 
included in the second-order state of affairs cataloging all the first order 
states of affairs, then the negative statement is true without having a truth-
maker. But, we may ask, is it not then the case that the negative statement is 
true in virtue of the fact that the relevant positive state of affairs is not includ-
ed in the totality of states of affairs or in virtue of existence of the state of 
affairs of the positive state's not being so included? 
A further difficulty for such accounts is that the want of a truth-maker 
for an affirmative existential statement or the absence of a positive state of 
affairs from a second-order state of affairs does not always seem to consti-
tute plausible grounds for denying truth-makers to a negative statement. 
Take (2), for example. The want of a truth-maker for "Dinosaurs are alive 
today" or the absence of the relevant state of affairs from the totality of 
states does not seem to make it true that dinosaurs are extinct today. The 
same goes for "Dinosaurs are still alive today," for the negation of that sort 
of statement is notoriously ambiguous. The difficulty is that (2) seems to 
imply the positive assertion that dinosaurs were once alive and so needs 
more than just the lack of a truth-maker in order to be true. It seems to 
require as its truth-maker the fact that dinosaurs were once alive and now 
are not alive. In any case, even if negative existential statements are not 
made true in virtue of some fact or state of affairs, the anti-Molinist can 
hardly be encouraged by the prospect that we have here an exception to 
notion that true statements require truth-makers. If there can be true state-
ments without any truth-makers of those statements, how do we know 
that counterfactual statements cannot be true without truth-makers? 
Statement (3) is a universally quantified statement which as such does 
not apply merely to any ravens which happen to exist. Therefore, it cannot 
be true just in virtue of existing ravens' being black, much less in virtue of 
the black ravens there are. Statement (4) is an ethical judgement which 
implies neither that children exist nor that any are ever actually tortured. It 
is hard to see how ethical and aesthetic judgements can be made true apart 
from ethical and aesthetic facts being among their truth-makers. 
Statements (5) and (6) are tensed statements about persons who no 
longer or do not yet exist (at least on a dynamic theory of time'6) and so can-
not have such persons among their truth-makers. Truth-maker theorists 
have yet to grapple seriously with problems posed by tense and temporal 
becoming. But in a recent discussion Barry Smith offers two proposals: 
either we "need to introduce an explicit temporal dimension into our 
account of truthmaking, along the lines of: this liquid makes it true at t that 
it is odourless," or alternatively, we "might embrace a strictly presentist 
reading of IX makes it true that p'. Some true contingent past and future 
tense judgments will then be such that, while their truthmakers do not exist, 
they did or will exist."l? These brief suggestions are merely programmatic; 
but the first seems to contemplate tenselessly existing truth-makers of 
tensed sentences along the lines of a static theory of time/8 while the second 
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appears to involve tensed truth-makers of tensed sentences such as might 
be postulated in a dynamic theory of time.19 Smith's suggestion for this lat-
ter view is to assert that past- and future-tense statements literally have 
(present-tense) no truth-makers, although they either did or will. This sug-
gestion is problematic, however, because when the truth-maker of, say, a 
future-tense sentence like "Bush will be inaugurated as our forty-second 
President" becomes present, then that statement, far from being true, is 
false, and the corresponding present-tense statement, "Bush is being inau-
gurated as our forty-second President" is or becomes true. Thus, we should 
more plausibly say either that true past- and future-tense statements have 
no truth-makers at all, though their present-tense counterparts did or will 
have or that their truth-makers are the present-tense statements' having 
been or going to be true, or more simply the tensed facts stated as their 
tensed truth conditions, as disclosed by the disquotation principle. None of 
this is encouraging to the anti-Molinist, for again we find an important class 
of statements which either are true without having truth-makers or else 
have as their truth-makers abstractions like facts or states of affairs. 
Finally, statement (7) is a true counterfactual about the aether of nine-
teenth century mechanics, which does not exist. One cannot say that the 
aether's properties serve as the truth-maker of (7), for the aether, being 
non-existent, has no properties. Of course, if the aether did exist, the aether 
would have properties, so perhaps one could say that what makes (7) true 
is the fact that in the most similar possible worlds in which the antecedent 
is realized, the indicative version of the consequent has a truth-maker-but 
this would be of no comfort to anti-Molinists who presuppose that truth-
makers must be or imply the existence of concrete objects. 
All of the above types of truths are matters of vigorous discussion 
among truth-maker theorists. These illustrations and the controversies 
they engender underscore just how naive an understanding grounding 
objectors generally have of the nature of truth-makers. The idea that the 
truth-makers of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom must be literal peo-
ple or any sort of concrete object is extraordinary.2o 
Do Counterfactuals ofCreatlirely Freedom Need Truth-Makers? 
Now, as I say, it is a matter of considerable debate whether true proposi-
tions do have truth-makers at all. Truth-maker theorv is, after all, a minori-
ty position, associated in analytic philosophy with thinkers in the tradition 
of Logical Atomism. Simons admits that since Tarski's development of 
truth-theory without truth-makers, it has been widely held that there is "no 
need" for truth-makers, such as Russell and Wittgenstein advocated.21 In a 
recent critique, Greg Restall demonstrates that given the customary axioms 
of truth-maker theory, it follows that every true proposition is made true by 
every truth-maker there is, so that, for example, Grass is green is made true 
by snow's being white. In a monumental understatement, Restall muses, 
"This is clearly not acceptable for any philosophically discriminating 
accOlmt of truthmakers."22 Perhaps these difficulties in truth-maker theory 
can be ironed out;23 but the point remains that the doctrine is controversial 
and cannot just be assumed to be true. 
344 Faith and Philosophy 
In any case many truth-maker theorists themselves reject the doctrine of 
tnlth-maker maximalism/4 the doctrine that every true statement has a truth-
maker. I have yet to encounter an argument for the conclusion that coun-
terfactuals of creaturely freedom cannot be among those types of truths 
lacking a truth-maker. Indeed, when one reflects on the fact that such 
statements are counterfactual in nature, then such statements might seem to 
be prime candidates for belonging to that diverse class of statements which 
are true without having any truth-makers. Truth-maker theory, which is 
still in its nascence, has not yet, to my knowledge, been applied to such 
counterfactuals. But the analogy with past- and future-tensed statements 
is suggestive. Freddoso has argued that just as future-tense statements or 
propositions are grounded in the fact that a relevant present-tense proposi-
tion will have grounds of its truth, so a counterfactual of creaturely free-
dom is grounded in the fact that a relevant indicative proposition would 
have grounds of its truth. He explains, 
A realist about the absolute fuhlre will claim that there are now ade-
quate metaphysical grounds for the truth of a future-tense proposi-
tion Fp just in case there will be at some future time adequate meta-
physical grounds for the truth of its present-tense counterpart p .... 
But if this is so, then it seems reasonable to claim that there are 
now adequate metaphysical grounds for the truth of a conditional 
future contingent F t (p) 011 H just in case there would be adequate 
metaphysical grounds at t for the truth of the present-tense proposi-
tion p on the condition that H should obtain at t." 
On Freddoso's account, contingent propositions of the form Fp or F t (p) on 
H do have truth-makers, namely the fact or state of affairs that p will have a 
truth-maker or p would have a truth-maker under the relevant condition respec-
tively. 
In his analysis of Freddoso's view, Timothy O'Connor maint<lins that it 
would be more accurate simply to say that future contingent propositions 
have no grounds of their truth, but that they are true just in case their rele-
vant present-tense counterparts will have grounds of their truth.26 That is to 
say, propositions of the form Fp have truth-conditions which may be satisfied 
even though they lack truth-makers. This revision of Freddoso's view is 
along the lines of Barry Smith's second suggestion for dealing with future-
tense statements. Analogously, O'Connor proposes, we should reinterpret 
Freddoso's truth-makers for counterfactuals of creaturely freedom as giving 
tmth-conditions for propositions of the form F t (p) on H, while maintaining 
that such propositions do not have truth-makers. Although O'Connor, as 
an anti-Molinist, is none too happy about this analogy between future con-
tingent propositions and counterfactuals of creahlrely freedom, he grudg-
ingly acknowledges its coherence and chooses to attack Molinism else-
where.27 But the point remains that it is far from obvious that counterfactu-
als of creaturely freedom have to have truth-makers in order to be true. 
Anti-Molinists have not even begun the task of showing that counterfactu-
ah of creaturely freedom are members of the set of propositions or state-
ments which require truth-makers if they are to be true. 
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Do Counterfactuals ofCreaturely Freedom Have Truth-Makers? 
But suppose that future-tense statements and counterfactuals of crea-
turely freedom do belong to that class of propositions or statements requir-
ing truth-makers in order to be true. What is wrong with the facts or states 
of affairs proposed by Freddoso as the truth-makers of such propositions? 
O'Connor's declamation, "Freddoso's suggestion is just wrong, for there is 
not anything 'there' in the world which is its grounds"28 reveals that he is 
presupposing the same naIve understanding of truth-makers exposed ear-
lier. Facts or states of affairs such as Freddoso mentions routinely serve as 
perfectly respectable truth-makers. Perhaps one could try to exclude 
Freddoso's truth-makers by putting a nominalistic spin on facts and states 
of affairs, but the anti-Molinist can hardly think that an objection based on 
so controversial a metaphysical thesis as that will have more warrant than 
the affirmation that there are true future tense statements and counterfac-
tuals of creaturelv freedom. 
O'Connor als~ argues that Freddoso's view spawns a vicious infinite 
regress of grounds of truth. For a true future-tense proposition Fp is said 
to have grounds of its truth just in case there will be grounds of the truth of 
p at some future time. Here the grounds of the truth of Fp are stated by 
means of another statement which is also of the form Fp. We are off on an 
infinite regress, O'Connor insists, which is vicious because no statement 
has unconditional grounds of its truth.'9 But O'Connor has conflated the 
truth-maker of Fp with the truth-conditions of the statement that Fp has a 
truth-maker. On Freddoso's view the truth-maker of any proposition Fp is 
the fact that there will be a truth-maker of p. Facts do not themselves have 
truth-makers, so there is no regress. 
Nevertheless, O'Connor's objection is helpful in that it draws attention 
to the fact that even Freddoso's account of the truth-makers of future-tense 
propositions requires the existence of tensed facts, a point which is insisted 
upon independently by advocates of a dynamic theory of time/o which, it 
will be recalled, is presupposed by this version of truth-making for tensed 
sentences. That raises the question whether we might not as well just let 
the relevant tensed facts be the truth-makers of tensed propositions. The 
regress spotted by O'Connor concerns the truth-conditions of the sentence 
"There are now grounds for the truth of Fp," and this regress is benign, 
since it is simply a series of entailments of one future-tense proposition by 
another. 
Indeed, O'Connor had better hope that such a regress is benign, since on 
his own view Freddoso's formula does successfully give the truth-condi-
tions of any future-tense proposition Fp, viz.: 
Fp == P will have grounds at some future time t. 
Since the right-hand side of the equivalence has itself the form Fp, one 
embarks on an infinite regress. In agreeing that Freddoso's formula does 
successfully give the truth conditions of a future-tense proposition despite 
the infinite regress involved, O'COlmor tacitly agrees that such a regress is 
benign. O'Connor protests that he does not face the same problem as 
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Freddoso because "this biconditional is not intended to prescribe a proce-
dure by which it may be determined whether a future contingent is ground-
ed-it is simply indicating that it ... is in fact true."3! This alleged differ-
ence, however, is rooted in O'Connor's confusion noted above concerning 
the truth-maker of Fp and the truth-conditions of "Fp has a truth-maker"; 
there is on his own view still a (benign) infinite regress because the right-
hand side of the above equivalence has itself the form Fp. O'Connor also 
defends himself by saying that his adaptation of Freddoso's formula is not 
a prescription of "how one may determine whether such propositions are 
true."32 But, of course, neither is Freddoso intending to provide a prescrip-
tion for determining in O'Connor's epistemic sense whether Fp does have a 
truth-maker or not. 
Similarly, when we tum from future-tense propositions to counterfactu-
al propositions and consider Freddoso's proposed truth-makers for COLm-
terfactuals of creaturely freedom, we see that O'Connor's denial that "there 
is something 'there "objectively" to be known""3 is rooted in the same 
crude understanding of truth-makers already exposed. As for the suppos-
edly vicious infinite regress, it is again a benign regress of entailments gen-
erated by the truth-conditions of the statement "F t (p) on H has a truth-
maker." 
That the regress concerns truth-conditions, not truth-makers, is especial-
ly evident in Flint's defense of Freddoso's position. FlinJ proposes the fol-
lowing formula to give the truth-maker of a counterfactual of creaturely 
freedom C 0 ~ z: 
F. "It would be the case (if c were true) that z" is now grounded iff 
"z is grounded" would be the case (if c were true).34 
It is evident that what is provided here are truth conditions for the claim 
that" c D~ z is now grounded," not a truth-maker for c D~ z. In fact, iron-
ically, Flint never really does tell us what the truth-maker of c D~ z is! He 
misconstrues his own account when he says, for example, that a person's 
activity in a nearby possible world is what grounds a counterfactual of crea-
turely freedom which is true in the actual world. Such an interpretation 
conjures up ghostly images of merely possible agents doing things in their 
worlds which produce causal effects in ours, surely a bizarre and untenable 
picture! Rather on the Freddoso-Flint view, the truth-maker of c D~ z is 
something like the fact that the statement "z has a truth-maker" would be true (if 
c were true). This fact or state of affairs exists or obtains as robustly in tlle 
actual world as any other actual fact or state of affairs and is an unobjection-
able truth-maker. Thus it is a misconceived worry to wonder how merely 
possible activities ground actual truths, just as it is a misconceived worry to 
puzzle over how non-existent past or future activities could ground present 
truths. They do not. 
For my part, I should say that if true counterfactuals of creaturely free-
dom have truth-makers, then the most obvious and plausible candidates 
are the facts or states of affairs disclosed by the disquotation principle. 
Thus, what makes it true that "If I were rich, I would buy a Mercedes," is 
the fact that if I were rich I would buy a Mercedes. Just as there are tensed 
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facts about the past or future which now exist, even though the objects and 
events they are about do not, so there are counterfacts which actually exist 
even though the objects and events they are about do not. If counterfactu-
als of creaturely freedom require truth-makers, then it is in virtue of these 
facts or states of affairs that the corresponding propositions are true. And 
since these counterfacts are not the result of God's decree, the relevant 
states of affairs must obtain even logically prior to God's decree to create 
any concrete objects. 
In his development of the grounding objection, Hasker does seem to 
countenance states of affairs as truth-makers. But, he insists, "In order for 
a (contingent) conditional state of affairs to obtain, its obtaining must be 
grounded in some categorical state of affairs. More colloquially, truths 
about 'what would be the case . .. if must be grounded in truths about what 
is in fact the case."36 For example, the truth of counterfactuals like "1£ the 
glass were struck, it would shatter" is grounded "in the natures, causal 
powers, inherent tendencies, and the like, of the natural entities described 
in them."37 
Hasker's claim is, however, very muddled. Al, obtaining state of affairs 
just is the ground or truth-maker of some truth and so is not itself "ground-
ed" in the relevant sense. Moreover, truths do not have other truths as 
their grounds or truth-makers, but rather states of affairs. With respect to 
counterfactuals concerning instances of natural kinds like the glass, the 
truth of the cow1terfactual is arguably grounded in a dispositional proper-
ty of the object, such as in this case the glass's fragility. Such a disposition-
al property may be plausibly taken to be the truth-maker of the relevant 
counterfactual and even to ensure its necessary truth. l8 Moreover, it is cor-
rect to say that dispositional properties have a causal basis in the categori-
cal properties of a natural object, such as the molecular structure of the 
glass. But it is a non sequitur to conclude that the causal basis of a disposi-
tion is the truth-maker of the relevant counterfactual. For if there were dif-
ferent laws of nature, that same molecular structure might not serve to 
make glass fragile. It is the glass's fragility which is the truth-maker of the 
counterfactual at issue, and the causal basis of the disposition is at most 
responsible, not for the glass's fragility, but for the manifestation of that 
fragility, that is to say, for the actual shattering of the glass. Thus, in 
Armstrong's analysis the truth-maker for the categorical statement "The 
glass is fragile" is the glass's having a certain molecular structure plus the 
laws of nature." But the rub is that laws of nature, as Plantinga observes/' 
are equivalent to various counterfactual propositions, like "If x were cooled 
to 0°, it would expand/' so that one might just as well have said that the 
truth-maker of "The glass is fragile" is the glass's having a certain molecu-
lar structure plus certain counter facts of nature. Thus, even a categorical 
statement concerning dispositional properties of a natural object arguably 
has among its truthmakers certain counterfacts, not to speak of a counter-
factual statement grounded in the dispositional properties of an object. 
Thus, Hasker's claim that counterfactuals must be purely categorically 
grounded is unwarranted. 
How much more dubious is Hasker's claim when it comes to personal 
agents endowed with freedom of the will! For free choice is not a matter of 
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natural dispositions involving causal bases. Indeed, as I have elsewhere 
charged/1 the grounding objection seems implicitly to reject libertarian 
freedom, for on a libertarian view there is no further "grounding" to be 
sought for why there obtains a certain counterfactual state of affairs about 
how some agent would freely act under certain circumstances. To seek an 
answer to the question "Why is F a fact?" or "vVhat makes F a fact?" is 
implicitly to deny libertarian freedom. It is simply a fact that that is how 
that agent would freely choose to act under those circumstances. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I think that it is evident that anti-Molinists have not even 
begun to do the necessary homework in order for their grounding objec-
tion to fly. They have yet to articulate their ontology of truth, including the 
nature of truth-bearers and truth-makers. Nor have they yet presented a 
systematic account of which truth-bearers require truth-makers. Neither 
have they applied their theory to counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, 
much less shown its superiority to competing theories. Of course, it is 
open to grounding objectors to abjure a theory of truth-makers altogether 
and to assert that in construing their talk about grounds of truth for coun-
terfactuals of creaturely freedom in terms of truth-makers I have misunder-
stood or misrepresented them. Perhaps grounds of truth are different from 
truth-makers. But if that is the case, then anti-Molinists owe us all the 
more a careful account of what they are talking about. Until they provide 
that, their grounding objection cannot even hope to get off the ground. 
In short, I agree with Plantinga that I am far more confident that there 
are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom than I am of the theory 
which requires that they have truth-makers:2 And if they do require truth-
makers, no reason has been given why their truth-makers cannot be the 
facts or states of affairs which are disclosed by the disquotation principle:' 
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